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IMPOTENCE IN CANON LAW
PIERO L. FRATTIN*
AMONG THE VARIOUS matrimonial impediments affecting the licitness
as well as the validity of the marriage contract, the impediment
of impotence has been polarizing the attention of canonists, theologians
and medical experts for centuries. Even at the present time, it represents
ground for prolonged discussions on the inner interpretation of the
impediment, and on the application of the principles to practical cases.
This, we believe, is motivated by two main factors: impotence is an
impediment based on the very law of nature and, as such, is out of
reach of the Church's power to dispense from it, once it is shown present
beyond reasonable doubt. Hence is felt the impelling necessity of de-
limiting the field within which the impediment can be classified as
morally certain. Secondly, impotence, as a physical or physiological de-
fect, is regulated essentially by medical science, which is involved in a
constant process of development and improvement. This gives rise to
the extreme difficulty of combining harmoniously the varying medical
notions with the principles of canonical jurisprudence.
In general, impotence may be defined as the incapacity of perform-
ing the marital act, namely, the act towards which the matrimonial con-
tract by its nature is directed, and by which the spouses become one
flesh.' What is directly affected by a true condition of impotence is the
object itself of the matrimonial consent, i.e., the right to those acts
which are of themselves suitable and adequate for the generation of off-
spring.2
The outcome of a properly performed conjugal act is of no concern
to the law. The question of whether generation ensues has no juridical
consequences, since it is the law of nature alone that governs this mys-
terious process. Besides, persons may be perfectly capable of a normal
* J.C.D. (Canon Law at the Catholic University of America); J.C.L. (Compara-
tive Civil Law at the Lateran University, Rome, Italy); Procurator and Advocate
of the Supreme Tribunal of the Apostolic Signatura, and of the Sacred Roman
Rota.
1 See Can. 1015, § 1.
2 See Can. 1081, § 2.
copula, and yet generation be impossible
owing to some condition adverse to it in
one or both parties. We are, in this in-
stance, facing a case of sterility broadly
understood, not of impotence; we are con-
templating an incapacity for generation,
not a condition that hinders marital acts.
Sterility never affects either the licitness
or the validity of a marriage contract.3
In order to be classified as a diriment im-
pediment, i.e., as a circumstance invalidat-
ing marriage, impotence must be antecedent
to the celebration of marriage and, at the
same time, of perpetual nature. The fact that
the existence of such a defect is known to
the other party or not, or that impotence
is absolute or relative, has no bearing on
the validity of the matrimonial contract.4
The only valid issue is whether a condition
of impotence is de facto present and pos-
sesses those essential requisites of antece-
dence and perpetuity which the law re-
quires.
Perpetuity Is a Concept of Law
The question of the perpetual character
of impotence is a most disputed one. It is
the most frequent point of conflict between
the medical approach to the problem and
the doctrine held by the great majority of
canonists.
In our opinion, the whole issue cannot
be put into correct perspective, unless an
important principle is first clarified: the
concept of perpetuity of the impediment is
essentially a juridical one, determined, reg-
ulated and enlightened by the law. It is a
stable legal idea, not a mere question of
fact, variable according to the fluctuating
of circumstances.
3 See Can. 1068, § 3.
4 See Can. 1068, § 1.
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Indeed, impotence is at first a phase or
aspect of biology, and as such must be gov-
erned by medical science in general. When,
however, this abnormal condition is raised
to the standard of a matrimonial impedi-
ment, it becomes at once a juridic institute,
which has to be disciplined by legal princi-
ples, even though the physiological concept
of the defect in general is still based on bio-
logical notions.
Impotence, therefore, being primarily a
notio iuris, must have also its two main
features, viz., antecedence and especially
perpetuity, determined by law rather than
by medical science. This implies that all
achievements of medicine and all discover-
ies of surgery cannot be immediately intro-
duced with legal acknowledgment and force
into the province of law. They must first,
as it were, be sieved through juridical prin-
ciples and adapted to the juridical order.
For instance, the mere possibility of cur-
ing a true condition of impotence, without
any moral assurance of success, cannot in-
troduce an obligation for the patient to un-
dergo a prescribed treatment. Such an ex-
pedient of medicine is positively outside
the sphere of the canonical legislation,
since it is based exclusively on the ontologi-
cal order, while the laws of the Church per-
tain primarily to the ethical and juridical
order.
This doctrine is not certainly an elabo-
rate product of recent times, but was long
ago conceived by our canonical predeces-
sors. Schmalzgrueber once wrote that the
perpetuity of the impediment of impotence
does not depend on the fact of whether
or not the abnormal condition may be
cured, but relies rather on the circumstance
of whether or not the defect may be cured
without endangering the patient's life.5
"Impedimenti perpetuitas non pendet ex eo
IMPOTENCE
Thus the practical theory of a more or
less successful medical treatment as a test
to discern whether a condition is perma-
nent or temporary is overcome by a con-
sideration of legal nature. Not the medical
or surgical science, but the law must be
the direct source and the criterion of dis-
tinction between temporary and perpetual
impotence.
The Modern Canonical Approach
To the Problem
In general, a condition of impotence is
said to be perpetual not only when it can-
not be cured either through the simple
course of time or through appropriate
medical treatment, but also when it can be
remedied only by the use of extraordinary
or illicit means, or by seriously endanger-
ing the patient's health and life.
The terms describing the concept of per-
petuity in a definite way do not raise any
particular problem as to their understand-
ing; nevertheless, the application of the
principles to concrete cases may often pre-
sent difficulties, mainly in view of the ex-
act interpretation to be given to the words
"extraordinary," "illicit," and "dangerous."
The present canonical jurisprudence does
not register a complete uniformity of opin-
ions or of judicial decisions on the is-
sue. A particular remedy, for example,
is by some classified as extraordinary
when it surpasses the difficulty and risk
of a common and easy surgical opera-
tion.6 For others, however, a surgical treat-
quod tollatur vel non tollatur, sed ex eo quod,
spectata rei natura, tolli vel non tolli potest
absque vitae periculo." 4 SCHMALZGRUEBER, Jus
ECCLESIASTICUM UNIVERSUM, part IH, tit. XIV,
n. 44 (1843-45).
6 See ROMAN[, INSTITUTIONES JURIS CANONICI,
DE MATRIMONIO 552, n.821 (1945).
ment is not deemed extraordinary even if
it is of a serious nature, provided no grave
danger to the patient's health is involved. 7
It is not our intention to indulge in the
discussion of the theories set forth by var-
ious canonists. We rather prefer to illus-
trate a few principles which may hopefully
contribute to an adequate interpretation
of the concept of perpetual impotence, and
thus enlighten the solution of practical
cases.
Impotence is to be considered juridically
perpetual, if the means to be employed
in its treatment bring about a serious
bodily harm
It is an undisputed principle of ethics
that no human being is permitted to put his
life, the integrity of his members, or his
physical status into direct and proximate
danger, even for a justifiable purpose.
Whatever a person would do in this respect
would be regarded as an illicit act, con-
demned primarily by the natural law, and
consequently deprived of any legal effect
by the canonical legislation.
Thus, if a condition of impotence is of
such a nature as to be susceptible to cure
only by means of a surgical operation in
which the patient would risk his life, or put
his health in a serious hazard, the surgical
treatment must be classified as a medium
illicitum: the patient is thereby relieved of
any obligation to seek a remedy to his ab-
normal condition and his impotence is con-
sidered juridically incurable.
The danger, which makes a condition of
impotence perpetual in the eyes of the law,
embraces both the cases of death as well
as of grave diseases, when resulting direct-
7See CONTE E CORONATA, DE SACRAMENTIS, DE
MATRIMO o 386 (1946).
ly from medical intervention. In this, today's
jurisprudence is considerably more spe-
cific than the old canonical doctrine, which
described the risk theory on the question
by the vague expression "danger of the
body."'s
In case of doubt as to the danger in-
volved in a determined surgical treatment,
namely, when medical experts are morally
uncertain about the outcome of an opera-
tion as being dangerous to the patient's life
or health, danger is deemed to be present,
and consequently the condition of impo-
tence considered legally perpetual.9
In the evaluation of the instances of pos-
sible serious danger, however, one must
never take into account the innumerable
factors which may, by any chance, bring
about a great risk to the life or health of
the impotent party, and thus conclude the
existence of a canonically-understood dan-
ger. In the light of a principle affirmed by
St. Thomas, 1" it is the necessary medical
treatment itself, i.e., the surgical operation,
which represents the sole determining test
as to the presence of a real danger; not the
possible harmful effects and events that
may follow per accidens, either because of
complications not directly connected with
the operation, or on account of unskillful
8 "mpedimentum illud non erat perpetuum quod,
praeter divinum miraculum, per opus humanum
absque corporis periculo potuit removeri"--Cor-
pus Juris Canonici, c. 6, X, De frigidis et male-
ficiatis etc., IV, 15.
9 See SCHMALZGRUEBER, op. cit. supra note 5.
10 "Quando periculum nascitur ex ipso facto,
tunc illud factum non est expediens ... Sed si
periculum immineat ex hoc quod homo deficit ab
illo facto, non desinit propter hoc esse expediens
... Alioquin oporteret ab omnibus bonis cessare,
quae per accidens ex aliquo eventu possunt esse
periculosa." SUMMA THEOLOGIAE, 11-I, q. 88,
art. 4, ad 2.
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medical assistance. In these cases, impo-
tence would be termed as merely tempo-
rary.
Finally, the concept of what may con-
stitute serious danger is not such as to be
true and valid at all times, but varies ac-
cording to the progress of medicine. There-
fore, the principles of perpetuity, when
based on the notion of danger, may and have
de facto changed through the years in con-
comitance with new medical and surgical
discoveries. Furthermore, it is the com-
mon doctrine of the experts, coupled with
their constant practical experience, that
determines whether or not a certain treat-
ment may be considered dangerous. Un-
usual, fortuitous, and sporadic cases of
successful interventions are not granted any
juridical recognition, in conformity with
the doctrine of independence of law from
medical science, and in accordance with
their different criteria of judgment.1
The extraordinary nature of the means
of cure relieve the impotent party of the
obligation of restoring his sexual capacity
A principle sanctioned by the natural
law and adopted by moral theology pre-
scribes that any person, bound to achieve
a certain goal, is required to use only ordi-
nary means, and not necessarily extraordi-
nary ones.12 It follows as a consequence
1"In a case decided by the S. Roman Rota,
coram Wynen, on Oct. 25, 1945, the court, dis-
cussing the extraordinary cure of an obstruction
of the seminal ducts, wrote: "Sanatio ilia, quae
contra uniformem doctrinam auctorum et con-
stantem experientiam accidit, est res adeo extra-
ordinaria et inexplicabilis ipsis medicis qui virum
curarunt, ut inde nihil deduci possit"-S.R.R.
Dec., vol. XXXVII, dec. 64, n. 24, p. 592.
12 "Qui tenetur ad finem, tenetur adhibere media
ordinaria, quae ad ilium obtinendum requiruntur,
non autem per se extraordinaria." 2 NOLDIN-
SCHMITT, SUMMA THEOLOGIAE MORALIS 291,
ad 3 (1955).
IMPOTENCE
that, if the only available treatment for a
condition of impotence is represented by
an operation which may be classified as
extraordinary, no moral obligation to un-
dergo it is established and, therefore, the
patient is considered by the law as per-
petually impotent.
The determination of the precise meaning
of "extraordinary," in relation to medical
treatment in general, and of surgical opera-
tions in particular, has been a source of
various and conflicting statements among
legal experts. In our opinion, the issue
could be enlightened by using as a criterion
the difficulty involved or the rarity of oc-
currence as discriminating factors between
common and extraordinary means.
The criterion of difficulty referred to in-
dicates essentially the intimately delicate
nature of the surgical treatment, which may
require a meticulous preparation of the pa-
tient, a complex and highly precise ap-
paratus of instruments and a special tech-
nique of operation so as to avert a possible
deterioration of the conditions already ex-
isting. If these are the premises, the treat-
ment surpasses considerably the character-
istics of a common and easy surgical opera-
tion, and must, without hesitation, be
judged as an extraordinary remedy.
The idea of rarity of occurrence has to be
focused both on the number of surgeons who
perform a certain operation, as well as on
the number of cases in which the interven-
tion in question is accomplished. Thus,
for example, the operation of anastomosis
of the seminal ducts is performed in the
whole world by an extremely limited group
of surgeons, mainly because of the peculiar
specialization required. Should, therefore,
a patient need this kind of treatment, and
should he find himself in the moral impos-
sibility of profiting from the services of a
competent physician, no obligation to seek
a cure to his condition would be imposed.
Such a doctrine would apply also in the
case of a very wealthy person, who could
easily approach a skillful surgeon even in
other countries or continents. Notwith-
standing his financial means, he would not
be required to resort to such extraordinary
experiments.1  Consequently, his condition
of impotence would be looked upon as per-
petual in the mind of the law.
A morally certain success of the medical
treatment may also be taken as a test of
juridical distinction between temporary
and perpetual impotence
As we had occasion to remark, no prin-
ciple of law can be drawn from the mere
hope of possibility of cure, in reference
to the duty of restoring the sexual capacity.
The obligation begins to operate only
when the impotent person, after due con-
sideration and comparison of the results
of medical or surgical treatments, can be
morally certain of remedying his abnormal
condition in a short time, unless an unfor-
seeable event occurs.
In fact, no one can be forced to undergo
a considerable loss of goods, to upset his
habitual way of life, or to submit to long
and painful cures just to serve as an object
for experiments. An obligation is created
only when the party is compensated, for
whatever loss he suffers, with the morally
certain assurance of other goods of at least
equal value, even though of different kind.
Indeed, moralists teach us that not even a
superior can compel a subject of his to
13 "Nemo, ne ditissimus quidem, tenetur per se
advocare medicos peritissimos ad gravem mor-
bum depellendum" NOLDIN-SCHMITr, op. cit.
supra note 12, ad 3a.
undergo a serious surgical operation, unless
the patient is necessary for the good of the
community and "the success of the opera-
tion is morally certain."'1 4 Lacking this
requisite of morally understood certainty,
the impediment of impotence is of juridical
perpetual nature.
Conclusion
As we have briefly illustrated, the tem-
porary or perpetual juridical character of a
condition of impotence rests upon the de-
termination of whether or not the impotent
party may be bound to seek a restoration of
his sexual capacity. The absence of such
an obligation sanctions the legal perpetuity
of impotence, which, if proved also ante-
cedent, determines the absolute nullity of
the marriage already contracted.
The expedients of the illicit or extraor-
dinary means, as well as the criterion of a
morally certain success, must all be taken
into consideration before a definite judg-
ment on the nature of the impediment is
pronounced. This does not mean, however,
that they must all unanimously concur
towards the classification of a condition
of impotence as perpetual in the eyes of
the law. A positive answer to the question
of whether a certain remedy is illicit or ex-
traordinary, or a negative reply to the query
of whether a successful result of a treat-
ment can be morally assured, would amply
justify a conclusion in favor of the juridic
perpetuity of the impediment.
What would, however, be the legal status
of an impotent person who, despite the
physical danger involved in a certain oper-
ation, or notwithstanding the extraordinary
character of an intervention, or regardless
14 NOLDIN-SCHMITT, op. cit. supra note 12, at
292.
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of the lack of moral certitude for its happy
success, undergoes the surgical treatment
and, by the concurrence of a number of
inexplicable events, is restored in his sexual
capacity?
The answer must be sought in the prin-
ciples so far enunciated, and primarily in
the doctrine establishing the essenitially
juridical nature of the concept of per-
petuity. If a particular condition of impo-
tence is considered perpetual by the stand-
ard of judgment of the law, no change in
this legal attitude can be brought about by
a medical fact, which, because of its illicit
or extraordinary nature, or on account of
its inability to guarantee a morally certain
success, represents a medium deprived of
any juridical consequence. Law and medi-
cine follow two different patterns of rea-
soning and, since impotence is herein un-
derstood as an impediment rather than as a
physical or physiological state, it must be
governed by law, not by medical science.
Therefore, if the capacity to perform the
conjugal act is restored by means different
from those contemplated by the law, the
principle of perpetuity suffers no modifica-
tion.
In the case at issue, the regained potency
does not substantiate any indication of le-
gal value that the party's abnormal condi-
tion was simply temporary. In the judg-
ment of the law, that condition of impo-
tence still remains juridically perpetual in
its nature, at least up to the moment of the
exceptional medical intervention. Thus, if
a marriage has been already contracted, it
would be absolutely invalid, provided the
impediment possesses the other necessary
qualification of antecedence.
Nevertheless, law cannot ignore the per-
son's new condition of potency, especially
in reference to a possible future marriage,
 
